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Abstract:Turkey  passed  an  internet  censorship  law in  2007  with  the  declared  objective  of
protecting families and minors (Akdeniz, 2010). It established a unit within the regulator BTK
(Information and Communication Technologies Authority) responsible for imposing bans and
blocks on websites based on nine catalogue crimes defined by other national laws (Akgül 2008,
2009a, 2009b). As of May 2015, 80,000 websites were banned based on civil  code related
complaints  and  intellectual  property  rights  violations,  reports  the  independent  website
Engelliweb. Blocking decisions rendered by penal courts are enforced even when they are based
on grounds other that the nine catalogue crimes - such as terrorism, organised crime and crime
against the state. Passed in parliament while ignoring the pleas of NGOs and of the internet
sector, the Internet Law No. 5651 has since been used to temporarily ban popular platforms
such as Blogger, Last.fm, Vimeo, Wordpress and YouTube. At the same time, some blocking
decisions by the courts (e.g., Google and Facebook) were not enforced by the authorities. Since
its introduction, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that Law No. 5651 (Council of
Europe, 2011) is against the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 2013). This article
provides an overview of internet censorship and its social background in Turkey.
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INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of 2015 the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an advocacy group that
defends civil liberties in the digital world, wrote in one of its reports that “Turkey has been a
bastion of Internet censorship for so long that EFF could write a regular feature called This
Week in Turkish Internet Censorship and never run out of content” (Galperin, 2015).
The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and it has
since adopted a Western-oriented and secular strategy as the main pillars of social policy. In the
2002 elections, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) rose to power and its leader, Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, became the Prime Minister (he further became President on 10 August 2014).
Although the AKP officially promised to adhere to secular policy, the ever-increasing role of
religion under its rule led to widespread concern among the secular parts of society. Increased
intervention in the secular lifestyle such as partial alcohol ban and conversion of the secular
education system to a religious one were some of the factors that led to the Gezi uprising in mid-
2013 - where millions of demonstrators took to the streets in 79 of Turkey’s 81 provinces. The
Gezi events started to prevent the construction of a shopping centre in Gezi Park - one of the last
few remaining green areas in Istanbul’s city centre. Although the Gezi uprising was the fiercest
environmental  struggle  to  date,  discontent  and  anxiety  over  the  government's  policies
constituted the backdrop.
Internet blocking in the country accelerated after the Gezi events. Social media venues like
Twitter had proven to be effective in organising demonstrations and disseminating news about
the events. Website blocking gained a new momentum after corruption revelations about the
highest  echelons  of  the  government  surfaced  between 17  and 25  December  2013.  Explicit
recordings of corruption transactions were broadcast online. As a result, four cabinet ministers
had to resign. During that period, the partial blackout of the mass media, directly or indirectly
controlled by the government – sometimes through lucrative bids or unexpected tax fines, was
mainly bypassed via Twitter. Hence, the perception of the increased importance of the internet
became a leading factor in the acceleration of internet censorship in Turkey.
This  article  attempts  to  give  an  account  of  internet  censorship  in  Turkey.  It  provides  an
exploratory analysis of the nature of censorship and tries to analyse the relationship between
censorship and the social conditions at play. Details about the legal issues in blocking decisions
can be found in Akdeniz (2010) and Akdeniz and Altıparmak (2008). Due to the fact that
censorship in the country became more intense and technically more sophisticated in the last
few years,  we mainly  focus  on the  2010s.  This  article  also  compares  the  motivations  and
methods of other countries' censorship practices, such as those in place in Iran and China.
PREVIOUS WRITINGS ABOUT INTERNET CENSORSHIP
Censorship stems from the word “censor,” the government officer who had a wide range of
responsibilities in the Roman Empire, such as overlooking the population census, public morale
and government finances. Hence, the word is closely associated with inspection and auditing. In
today's world, censorship is one of the most commonly used concepts in political and social
science. Censorship can take many forms such as political censorship, which aims to prevent
dissemination of political and social news or, military censorship, which is usually implemented
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during war or under martial law. Self-censorship is a subtle form of censorship which implies
indirect, rather than direct imposition of censorship on one self (Arsan, 2013). This imposition
may either stem from avoiding a possible harm from authorities or assuring the continuation of
some form of benefit.
While in the last century censorship was often implemented in print or electronic mass media,
the ubiquity of the internet in the last few years resulted in the widespread implementation of
internet censorship in many countries. Censorship is usually regarded as an indicator of the
position of a country in the authoritarian-democratic continuum and it applies to all sorts of
media where news and ideas can be disseminated. Although countries like China, Iran and
Turkey are criticised for implementing widespread censorship practices on the internet and
other media (Arsan, 2013; Wojcieszak and Smith, 2014; Taneja and Wu, 2014), there are also
convincing voices which elaborate the subtle censorship practiced in “democratic” countries
(Wright and Breindl, 2013). This kind of censorship may either be practiced by corporate mass
media  (Herman and  Chomsky,  2002)  or  the  state  (ACLU,  2005).  However,  the  Snowden
revelations  showed  that  surveillance  intensifies  the  problem of  censorship,  particularly  in
Western countries, to the extent that self-censorship among US writers has increased after the
revelations (PEN America, 2014).
ROAD TO EXTENSIVE INTERNET CENSORSHIP IN
TURKEY
Turkey has taken a bold step in 2007 in order to regulate, and to ‘clean’ the internet from
undesirable content, which resulted in the censorship of websites. The censored sites ranged
from child and adult pornography websites to commonly used platforms such as YouTube,
Blogger or Alibaba.com.
Before 2007, sporadic censorship of websites did take place, the first well known one being
yolsuzluk.com (Turkish for corruption), which was banned by a decision of the Military Court
due to the publication of claims of corruption within the military. Then came the banning of
websites related to music files due to complaints by the Turkish Phonographic Industry Society.
The ban hit those websites that contained a link to other websites hosting audio files or software
for downloading audio files (Seçen, 2006).
Turkey joined the internet in April 1993. As early as 1991, drawing on French legislation, Turkey
enacted rudimentary computer related criminal law provisions (Yazıcıoğlu, 2011). In 2000-2001
the then government proposed an amendment to the press code with the provision of treating
the “Internet as a subject to Press Code.” In order to operate as press, you need to register with
the authorities and send two copies of each print issue to the Public Prosecutor for inspection.
The proposal included everything involving online communications. This caused widespread
uproar. Upon protests from the public, the amendment was softened and later returned by then
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (formerly head he of Constitutional Court,  nominated by all
parties) to the parliament for revision. Yet, the government insisted and the law was enacted.
That was the first law specific to the intenret passed by parliament. The main philosophy of the
code  was  to  increase  the  penalties  by  half,  whenever  the  internet  was  involved  in  the
commitment of a crime; which was already the rule for the press. Detailed information about the
code and reactions to it can be found in Draft RTUK Law (2001), RTUK Law (2001), Inet (2001)
and Akgül & Pekşirin (2001).
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In 2004, a new penal code was passed, this time including additional provisions on the internet
and computer crime. The Penal Procedural Code was consequently renewed but, it  did not
include any provisions regulating rights and responsibilities of internet actors; mainly internet
service providers (ISP). The Ministry of Justice formed a commission in order to prepare an
“Internet law” to accommodate missing parts of criminal law and procedure. The commission
started working in early 2006. The committee developing the ”Internet law” included members
from public institutions, faculty members from law schools and representatives from internet
NGOs. It prepared a draft bill named “Law on Network Services and Computer Crimes.” The
draft was to be presented to the Prime Minister’s Office (Akgül, 2006).
This could be interpreted as Turkey's attempt to comply with the Cybercrime Convention. The
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is the first international treaty dealing with internet and
computer crime. It was prepared by the Council of Europe, opened to signature in 2001 and
came  into  effect  in  2004  (Convention  on  Cybercrime,  2001).  Turkey  participated  in  the
preparation of the Cybercrime Convention but chose not to sign it. It is only in 2010 that the
government signed on to the Cybercrime Convention. It was finally ratified by parliament in
2014 on insistence of the opposition (Sanal Suçlar Sözlesmesi, 2001).
THE MAKING OF LAW 5651 ABOUT REGULATION OF
PUBLICATIONS ON THE INTERNET
As mentioned above, the Justice Ministry Committee for Internet Law prepared a draft entitled
“Law  on  Network  Services  and  Computer  Crimes.”  A  new  draft  was  prepared   by  the
Transportation Ministry with restricted scope. The Justice Ministry draft was published on the
website  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice  (Akgül,  2006).  It  was  then  opened  for  comments  and
contributions and sent to government institutions, with responses collected via official letters.
Comments  from public  institutions  and other  parties  were  compiled,  and were  taken into
account. The Justice Ministry Committee evaluated and decided by itself without any public
participation.
In the fall  of  2006,  child abuse and child pornography cases flooded the media.  The first
Computer Crime Unit was officially established at the Istanbul Police headquarters. It serviced
most of the child abuse and child pornography cases that were already available in printed form.
The internet pornography issue took such proportions in the media that it looked as if child
pornography was one of  the most  important  problems in Turkey.  This  came across  as  an
orchestrated effort to pass the Internet Censorship Law. Yet, in their assessment of the situation,
the Ministers of Interior and of Transportation differed on the magnitude of child pornography
in Turkey (Aydilek, 2006).
The Prime Minister asked the Minister of Transportation – rather than the Minister of Justice –
to  resolve  the  declared  paramount  child  pornography  problem  that  apparently  aimed  to
introduce  broad  measures  of  censorship  in  Turkey.  The  Transportation  Ministry  was
responsible  for  the  BTK  (Information  and  Communication  Technologies  Authority)  –  the
regulatory authority for the telecom sector, while Turkish Telecom is the dominant operator and
major ISP.1 Although a privatised entity, it has an intimate relationship with the state and has
an important role in carrying out the practice of censorship in the country.
Although the Ministry of Justice was not happy that it was bypassed, it could not object to the
Prime Minister and consequently,  lawyers at the Ministry of Transportation prepared what
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became the “Law for Regulating the Publications on the Internet and Suppression of Crimes
Committed  on such Publications  No.  5651.”  The  draft  of  the  Transportation Ministry  was
prepared behind closed doors, and only state institutions were allowed to participate in the
preparation process. Government ministers prepared the public opinion by promising a “clean
Internet”, “clean knowledge” and the “protection of children, family and family values” (Sabah,
2007a; Sabah, 2007b). On 29 March 2007 a one-day conference was held in Ankara entitled
“Clean Internet”, whose logo was three copies of the letter ‘W’ hanging from a laundry drying
string (Sabah, 2007a). The Transportation Minister declared a few times that “Turkey will be a
leader in providing a clean and safe Internet.  The World will  follow our example” (Sabah,
2007a; Sabah, 2007b).
Internet  and communication technology related NGOs tried to  alert  the public,  opposition
parties, the media and internet users against the intended censorship of the internet. “Defend
your Internet!” was the motto of the “İnternetine Sahip Çık ... İnternet Yaşamdır” campaign
(Internet Kampanyası, n.d.). The draft prepared by the Ministry of Transportation  was
submitted to the parliament. During deliberations of the Justice Committee in parliament, this
draft was softened to some extent. The initial draft was more drastic and would have covered all
communication media with the aim to monitor, filter and curtail chat and similar services. The
draft listed a catalogue of six crimes as defined by the Turkish Penal Code to be banned either by
the BTK or by penal courts. This will be explored in detail in the next section. In parliament, the
Justice Committee mainly made two additions: i) crimes against the founder of the Republic,
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, were included in the catalogue list, ii) a “Notice and Takedown” clause
(TBMM, 2007).
The Justice Committee version passed in parliament upon a 59-minute deliberation with no
major opposition on 4 May 2007 (Law 5651, 2007). One opposition MP of the Republican Party,
Osman Çoşkunoğlu, asserted that ICT-related NGOs were against the Law and suggested that
NGO concerns should be dealt with. The Transportation Minister Binali Yıldırım of the AKP
stated that they will be taken care of and the law passed quietly. No one talked about the danger
of censorship, nor defended freedom of expression, nor again claimed the unconstitutionality of
the passed law. The main opposition party, the People Republican Party (CHP), could have
brought the Law before the Constitutional  Court  for annulment,  but remained silent.  ICT-
related NGOs appealed to President Sezer to send the Law back to parliament to be discussed
once more, but he did not overturn the decision. Child pornography cases created such an
atmosphere that no politician could have adopted a position without the danger of being seen as
promoting it.
On 4 May 2007, the Law No. 5651 came into effect. Passing the required secondary regulations
took another six months and by the end of November 2007, Law No. 5651 “Internet Ortamında
Yapılan Yayınların Düzenlenmesi ve Bu Yayınlar Yoluyla İşlenen Suçlarla Mücadele Edilmesi
Hakkında  Kanun”  (Regulation  of  Publications  on  the  Internet  and  Combating  Crimes
Committed by Means of Such Publications) was fully in force.
WHAT DID LAW NO. 5651 PROVIDE?
The law provided some definitions and organisational structure, a catalogue of crimes, the legal
framework for banning websites and a few procedures. It defined the concepts of information,
data,  traffic  data,  publication,  internet  medium,  internet  publication,  monitoring,  access,
hosting, access and content providers, and internet usage provider. It classified ISPs as either
access providers, host providers, content providers or commercial usage providers; also, it listed
their accountability and responsibilities.  The Law and secondary regulations requested that
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access and hosting providers register and acquire a license from the BTK. Commercial usage
providers such as internet cafes apply for and get licenses from local authorities. For commercial
content providers, a clear listing of contact information and hosting information is required
online. There are monetary penalties and invalidation of license if these requirements are not
fulfilled.
A classification of in-country and out-of-country websites and hosting companies was made
without any definition. A registered hosting company is regarded as in-country even if  the
hosting  machines  are  outside  the  country.  If  a  hosting  company located  in  Turkey  is  not
registered, it is then categorised as out-of-country for banning purposes. If the purpose is
other, the company is treated as in-country.
Prior to Law No. 5651, a division of the BTK called the Presidency of Telecommunication and
Communication (TIB) was established with the mandate of performing legal telephone tapping.
In the course of the new legislation, this division progressively evolved in becoming responsible
for internet related issues such as blocking websites,  along with telephone tapping. Almost
hundred positions were reserved for the TIB, 32 of which were filled within a few months in
2007.2
The main task of the TIB is to observe and monitor the internet and take precautions to “clean”
it,  i.e.  to prevent online content relevant to Turkey that is  considered harmful  from being
accessed. The TIB division itself has the authority to determine the level of monitoring and
filtering. It also enforces regulation and monitoring of internet cafes, so as to make sure that
they keep necessary logs and prevent harmful content to be accessed by customers.
If the web or hosting company is out-of-country, the TIB has the authority to ban harmful
content from the catalogued list of crimes without the need to get permission from a court. If the
website or hosting is within the country, then the TIB needs a court order to ban it. However, in
the case of emergency (such as with child pornography or where human life is in danger) the
prosecutor can ban a website due to harmful content. In such a case, a court order within 24
hours is required. The aggrieved party can appeal the ban decision using regular procedures.
The Law provides a procedure for removal of content and right to reply. It is called “notice and
takedown.” It starts with a request to ISPs to take down the offending content and could result
in imprisonment of the ISP’s head between two months and two years by a Penal Court.3 When
the harmful content is removed from the banned site, the decision to ban the particular website
is  reversed upon the verification of  removal of  the offensive material  by the TIB, court or
prosecutor. In some cases, the court appoints an expert witness for this verification.
Secondary  regulation  specifies  banning  or  “curtailing  access”  via  two  methods:  i)  DNS
tampering and, ii) IP blocking. Courts sometimes order both of these measures at the same time.
URL blocking  is  initially  not  implemented,  even  though NGOs demand URL blocking  for
offensive objects only,  instead of  blocking the entire website.  URL blocking,  which we will
discuss, was put into law in 2013.
THE CATALOGUE CRIMES
Law No. 5651 lists the following as catalogue crimes with reference to the provisions of the
Turkish Penal Code (TCK) and other laws (Law 5651, 2007):4
incitement to suicide (TCK-84)1.
sexual abuse of children (TCK-103), i.e. child pornography2.
facilitation of the use of narcotics (TCK-190)3.
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provision of substances harmful to the health (TCK-194)4.
obscenity (TCK- 226)5.
prostitution (TCK-227)6.
facilitation of gambling (TCK-228)7.
the crimes against Atatürk (law 5816)58.
betting/gambling (sports law)9.
The TIB has the authority to unilaterally block or ban the whole website, when hosted outside of
Turkey, via DNS tampering or IP blocking. Whereas the TIB can only block a website for these
alleged crimes, independent courts can ban any website for any reason they see fit under the
national laws and regulations. After Law No. 5651 was implemented, several social networking
and other platforms such as Wordpress, Geocites, Alibaba, Richarddawkins.net or Blogger were
banned by invoking Civil Code or Intellectual Property Rights violations. It must also be noted
that many of these decisions were later lifted.
CENSORSHIP IN PRACTICE
The  following  cases,  ordered  chronologically,  provide  some  insight  into  Turkey’s  internet
blocking mechanism.
Eksisözlük (sourtimes.com) is a Turkish social networking website which is organised as a
dictionary where people can comment on entries. The courts blocked this website, run by a
small company, on 6 January 2006 (Andaç, 2006; Eksi Sozluk, n.d.). However, the company
appealed and the ban decisions were later removed.
The  Youtube.com  case  best  exhibits  the  many  flaws  of  the  Turkish  censorship  system.
Youtube.com was first banned in 2007 before the internet censorship law was enacted. The
reason was a video insulting Atatürk that was allegedly uploaded by a Greek youngster. The two
largest national dailies took this seriously, carried the news to their front pages and set up a
letter campaign to protest. Then, the state prosecutor for media intervened and brought the case
to court. The judge saw the video on a CD and decided to block Youtube.com. Although Youtube
was  reopened after  several  months,  it  was  later  banned several  times  for  shorter  periods
(Youtube Censorship, n.d.). The 2008 Youtube ban lasted more than two years. Until 2014,
there were more than 30 court decisions banning Youtube.
The Wordpress.com case: In Turkey, Adnan Oktar is a well-known creationist and the head of
an  Islamic  foundation.  His  lawyers  have  become  known  for  the  rigorous  persecution  of
webpages that contain a defamatory statement about his activities. They have gone to court in
various parts of the country to get court orders for banning websites. Following one of these
decisions, the whole wordpress.com website was banned in August 2007 (Butt, 2008). After
several months, a blogger objected and the ban was lifted.
Ateizm.org is a portal and forum for Turkish atheists. There, an expert, Turan Dursun, was
questioning the main concept of Islam. Ateizm.org, turandursun.com and similar websites were
banned in 2007 (O'Connor, 2008; Religious Tolerance, 2009). Reflecting the general attitude of
the  Turkish  government  against  left-wing  movements.  Anarsist.org,  a  forum  for  Turkish
anarchists, was banned in 2008 (Önderoğlu, 2008). Both these decisions were later lifted.
Alibaba.com is the largest B2B platform in the world. It is mainly the largest import-export
shop in the world. The Turkish government subsidises Alibaba. The website was banned for a
trademark dispute between two construction firms. One firm went to court for removal of a
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picture from the other firm's webpage, claiming violation of trademark. The court decided for
the removal of the picture. Upon not removing the picture, the court ordered the blocking of
Alibaba.com. The blocking continued for over a week. Although the court could have decided on
a fine, it preferred to ban the whole website in February 2008 (Bilisim ve Hukuk, 2008).
Richarddawkins.net included a comment about Adnan Oktar’s book rejecting Darwinian
evolution. Adnan Oktar went to court claiming the comments are defamatory. The court banned
the site without any trial in September 2008 (Guardian, 2008). Richard Dawkins waited for
notice of a trial and a chance to defend himself. The website finally reopened after a long legal
fight.
Egitimsen.org.tr is the website of a trade union in the educational sector. The head of the
trade union made a statement to the media about a book written by Adnan Oktar. In 2008
Oktar's  lawyers  went  to  court  claiming  that  the  website  of  the  union  carried  defamatory
statements.  The  court  banned  the  website  (Schleifer,  2008),  but  trade  union  lawyers
successfully appealed to the court in favour of lifting the ban. The offending statements made
two years earlier were removed from the site.
Since 2008, Geocities.com  is  another indefinitely banned website in Turkey. There is no
scheduled trial and no appeal for reversal of the decision. It could be accessed within Turkey as
of May 2015 but a note indicated that the site was blocked via a court order.
Blogger.com  was  banned  in  October  2008 by  a  Diyarbakır  Court  upon  a  complaint  by
Digiturk,  a broadcasting company that had the rights to broadcasting the Turkish Football
League matches (Censorship Turkey, n.d.). The company questioned the existence of about 60
blogs that contained links to illegal broadcasting of football matches. Digiturk is an Istanbul
company, while Diyarbakır is located in Eastern Turkey. As a result, the court banned the whole
blogger.com and blogspot.com platforms. Later, the court suspended its decision, and as of May
2015, the case is still pending.
Sites.google.com was banned after a long process. The site hosted a blog which contained
anti-Atatürk remarks and insults.  An NGO whose main purpose is to promote the ideas of
Atatürk went to the state prosecutor in Ankara and asked for the blocking of the website in 2009
(Open Society, 2011). A different court in Denizli, far away from Ankara, banned the whole
sites.google.com in 2010. The court justified its decision by the fact that it was not technically
possible to block an individual URL. IP-based blocking had to be made, said the court. A PhD
student who published his work on sites.google.com appealed to that decision and went to the
European  Court  of  Human Rights  (ECHR)  and  the  court  found  that  Turkey  violated  the
European Convention on Human Rights (Convention on Cybercrime, n.d.). Currently, both IP-
based and URL-based blockings are made in Turkey.
Facebook was banned in 2009 but the decision was not implemented. A Facebook group was
formed that claimed that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, president of the main opposition party CHP, was
supporting the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Kılıçdaroğlu's lawyer went to court asking
for the blocking of this group and if not possible, the full blocking of Facebook.com. The court
approved the request. The decision of the court was transmitted to the TIB, but the TIB did not
implement the decision stating that the insult does not fall within the catalogued crimes. If the
decision of the court had been transmitted to ISPs, then it would have been implemented.
Kılıçdaroğlu then went to court asking the head of the TIB be tried for not implementing a court
decision.  As of  May 2015,  the case is  still  pending.  There are about 500 Facebook groups
supporting Kılıçdaroğlu, and just a few groups opposing him. Then again, the CHP has about
Internet censorship in Turkey
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 9 June 2015 | Volume 4 | Issue 2
500 Facebook groups created by various branches (NTVMSNBC, 2010).
Twitter was an important venue for communication during the Gezi events between May and
June  2013.  Twitter  usage  surged  substantially  during  the  Gezi  protests.  Twitter’s  role  is
important when it comes to freedom of expression in Turkey, especially against the backdrop of
widespread complaints about the direct and indirect control of mass media by the government
(Nielsen, 2013). Then Prime Minister Erdoğan, who has over five million followers on Twitter
(@RT_Erdogan), labelled Twitter “a menace to society” (Nielsen, 2013; Huffington Post, 2013).
This follows the appearance of corruption-related material6 on Twitter about Erdoğan and four
cabinet ministers. Erdoğan vowed to eradicate Twitter on 20 March 2014 (Watson & Tuysuz,
2014). Twitter was blocked on that day without a court order (Dockterman, 2014). The ban was
lifted three days after the 30 March 2014 elections by the Constitutional Court (BBC, 2014a). In
the  following  months  some  Twitter  accounts  (eg.  @Haramzadeler333  ,  @Bascalan  and
@fuatavni), from where corruption charges were leaked, were also blocked (Musil, 2014).
Websites supporting ISIS and al-Qaeda derivatives, however, are not blocked in Turkey.
Sites  like  takvahaber.net  and  mustaqim.net,  which  openly  disseminate  ISIS  propaganda,
function as a recruiting tool and call to violence operate freely in the country (Arango, 2015).
The Turkish government is demanding that Google, Twitter and Youtube open an office in
Turkey, issue invoices from Turkey, pay due taxes, and more importantly, respond swiftly to the
demands of internet censorship whether they be issued by a court or the TIB. Such demands are
usually declined.
Engelliweb, a watchdog website that monitors the blocked websites in Turkey reports as of
May 2015 roughly 80,000 blocked websites. The real figure is well above these numbers, as
Engelliweb only reports the blocked websites signalled by internet users. The real number and
the list of blocked websites are never disclosed by the government. About 93% of the sites
registered by Engelliweb are blocked by a decision of the TIB, i.e. without a court order. The
majority of the blocked sites contain pornographic material. The second group contains the
websites of  dissident political  groups and Kurdish insurgent movements.  Almost all  of  the
pornographic websites are international and do not specifically target Turkish audiences. On the
contrary, the banned political websites target the audience in Turkey and can only be accessed
by VPN.
DEEP PACKET INSPECTION
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is one of the primary surveillance and blocking methods on the
internet. Data travels as small units called ‘packets’ over the internet. Each packet includes an
address portion and a data portion that contains the real content (e.g. part of a photo to be
displayed on a website). Normally, routers located at ISPs check only the address portion of each
packet and direct the packets to their destination addresses. This modus operandi is one of the
features of “net neutrality,” one of the main tenets of the internet. DPI systems form the basis
for violations of net neutrality. By checking not only the address portion of a packet but all of it,
DPI enables discriminatory treatment of traffic. As such, these systems facilitate the monitoring
of the content of a message as it travels through the ISP hardware. DPI systems can also be used
for some other tasks such as network optimisation, blocking or throttling down content.
Phorm, a company specialised in behavioural advertisement systems over the internet, uses
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TTNET,  the  largest  ISP  in  Turkey,  as  its  infrastructure  partner.  It  implements  the  DPI
technology which profiles internet users by assigning unique ID numbers to them. Through
these ID numbers, every action of the user is recorded for the declared objective of displaying
relevant advertisements to him/her. However, such profiling also helps determine the political,
religious and sexual orientation of the user as well as his/her membership to political parties,
trade unions and other communities.7
TTNET was fined by the regulatory body BTK for supporting Phorm's activities in Turkey, which
mislead internet users (Aru, 2013). Phorm’s operations were stopped for about four months,
before resuming in April 2013.
FILTERING THE “SECURE” INTERNET
On 22 February 2011, the BTK announced that the “Secure Usage of Internet” project would be
implemented on 22 November 2011. All Internet subscribers were obliged to choose one of four
profiles  to  access  the  internet,  namely  “family”,  “standard”,  “children”  or  “domestic”  (in-
country).
This caused a major uproar in the country and on 15 May of that year, a major demonstration
was held in Turkey’s major cities. The BTK withdrew the decision and introduced a modification
which  included  voluntary  “family”  and  “child”  profiles  only.  These  profiles  worked  as  a
voluntary filter that blocked “unwanted” material. The child profile consisted of a “white list” of
URLs that are determined by the BTK. The family profile blocked a set of websites, in other
words a “black list.” All lists were determined by the BTK and the ISPs were obliged to apply
filtering to the subscribers that had opted for these profiles.
As of the summer 2013, 1.4 million subscribers had opted for a filter. They thereby agreed to
voluntarily limit their internet access according to the above-mentioned lists. While the length
and content of lists are unknown, one can check whether a website is listed or not. There are no
defined procedures for listing a website or remove it from a list.
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND THE RULE OF LAW
At the end of 2008 the BTK published a report providing statistics on the number of websites
blocked by the TIB and by court orders during that year, by categories of offense. Since then, the
agency has stopped providing details. Attempts to dig out the reasons by means of freedom of
information requests have systematically been unfruitful (Palabiyik, 2015). As stated above, the
TIB blocks  websites  according  to  decisions  given  either  by  the  court  or  the  TIB,  without
attempting to dialogue. In other words, civil servants are often those deciding on the blocking of
websites, i.e. restricting several freedoms, such as the freedom of expression. Very rarely does a
ban result in a trial. The TIB publishes not the numbers but percentages of blocked websites in
terms of categories. As of September 2014, child related blocks are at 10%, prostitution at 4.6%,
obscenity at 84%, Atatürk-related blocks close to 0.04%, and the remaining categories make up
the remaining 1.2% (Guvenliweb, 2014).
International media covered the wave of “Gezi protests” (May-June 2013) live and the number
of Twitter users jumped from 2 million on 28 May to 8 million on 10 June (Yalçıntaş, 2015).
Government responded with attempts to discourage usage of social media in relation to the
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protests. At the peak of the demonstrations, the police raided youngsters at night for their
Twitter usage (Harding and Letsch, 2013). Partly due to the effect of social media on the Gezi
protests,  an amendment  to  Law No.  5651  was  passed by  parliament  on 5  February  2014,
and approved by President Abdullah Gül, a founder of the AKP. The new amendment envisaged
even harsher measures against freedom of expression on the internet (Järvinen, 2014a; Frosio,
2014).  The  amendment  was  passed  as  a  package  of  laws  and  amendments,  and  regular
procedures of consulting with state actors and outside stakeholders have not been followed. The
amendment introduced fast banning of websites in relation to privacy and personality rights,
access by the TIB to logs of all user activities on the internet, URL and IP blocking, and a new
government-controlled ISP union. URL blocking was justified by preventing blocking of whole
website  for  just  a  few  “harmful  contents”.  For  privacy  or  private  life  violation,  a  proper
application  to  the  TIB  is  enough for  immediate  banning  (within four hours)  of  the
offending URL. The complaint will also go to court within 24 hours, and the court will decide
within 48 hours. Even top TIB management can render such a decision, as long as it then goes
to court for approval within 24 hours. Although there is a time limit of four hours for
implementing a blocking decision, there is none for uplifting it. In addition, ISPs are obliged to
implement data retention, i.e. they have to log user activity and store the data between one and
two years, and submit to officials when requested by a court.
A union of ISPs was formed to centralise and speed up the process of banning a website. Bylaws
of this union are approved by the BTK. Once a court decides to order the ban of an undesirable
content, that decision is valid for all websites containing that content. The costs related to URL
blocking  and  other  filtering  is  left  to  corresponding  ISPs.  Collective  access  providers,  of
commercial nature or not (universities, firms, even large families) are forced to prevent access to
“unlawful” content. ISPs are asked to prevent any attempt to bypass blocking restrictions, while
bypassing blocking is not criminalised.
Internet cafes are subject to stringent regulations, which extend beyond limits defined by this
law. After Erdoğan's election as President, another amendment came into force on 8 September
2014,  just  after the United Nations Internet Governance Forum took place in Turkey.  The
amendment  was  justified  as  “protecting  the  esteem  and  honour  of  individuals  against
defamation on the Internet,” but it must be noted that this justification came to Turkish political
scenery  only  after  the  internet  became  an  efficient  medium for  disseminating  corruption
scandals  in  the  highest  echelons  of  politics.  On 2  October  2014,  the  Constitutional  Court
overturned  critical  parts  of  the  amendment  (Järvinen,  2014b).  Unperturbed  by  the
Constitutional Court's decision, the government simply waited for the retirement process of
some key members of  the Constitutional  Court  and brought the same amendments to the
parliament on 20 January 2015, “reinforced” by some harsher measures. By the newly added
amendments, authority for blocking decisions was widened to cabinet ministers who can justify
their  decisions by invoking the protection of  national  security,  public  order,  public  health,
prevention of crime, and protection of life and property. The new amendments were adopted by
the parliament on 19 March 2015 (CPJ, 2015a).  Currently,  the new bill  and accompanying
new laws, such as the Internal Security Bill (Al-Monitor, 2015), are applied in full force. The
application  of  the  law  is  seemingly  arbitrary,  sometimes  with  bizarre  consequences.  For
example, a university student was sentenced to one year for retweeting an article from the
popular  satirical  website  Zaytung,  which  “reported”  that  a  provincial  governor  declared
autonomy from Turkey. The article had the picture of the governor in a military vehicle and
surrounded by guards in a parade during a national holiday (Bolton, 2015) where it is customary
for governors to appear in such parades. Zaytung was not prosecuted for that article.
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TURKEY IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL
CENSORSHIP PRACTICES
Disregarding crimes such as child pornography, which are unacceptable in all cultures, internet
censorship  is  usually  justified  by  protecting  the  so-called  “existing  social  system”  in  any
given country. In this context, the social system implies the social and economic relationships
between social classes and individuals. There is also a second implication for the social system
which has personal overtones in the context of censorship. Adult pornography is an example
which is regarded as a threat to this perception of social system. Many countries either apply
varying degrees of censorship or develop measures for enforcing self-censorship to protect their
social  systems. Albeit  with much harsher measures,  Turkey is  no exception in this matter.
Internet censorship in Turkey used to have mainly two pillars: preventing “undesired” political
messages  and fighting  pornography.  Indeed,  the  majority  of  blocked websites  reported  by
Engelliweb are related to pornography. There are also websites of political nature which are
regarded to be harmful. However, it must be stated that the phrase “existing social system” is
getting increasingly vague in Turkey due to the fervent efforts of the ruling AKP party and
President Erdoğan to transform the country into what he calls “new Turkey.” This provokes a
sizeable tension in the deeply divided society where more than half of the population is anxious,
perceiving the country as being dragged into a fundamentalist abyss experienced already by
countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Libya. This in turn results in a higher
level of struggle against the current trend and thus, an increased level of internet censorship.
Beyond the usual  practices  of  internet  censorship which aim to protect  the existing social
system, Turkey has made a significant “contribution” in this area since the 17-25 December 2013
events: internet censorship in Turkey is applied en masse for preventing the dissemination of
news about corruption and for “protecting the esteem and honour” of corrupt politicians (The
Center for Internet and Society, n.d.; ARTICLE 19, Committee to Protect Journalists, English
PEN, Freedom House, P24 and PEN International, 2014; Amnesty International, 2014). This
type of censorship is not as easy as blocking individual websites wth tiny audiences. Corruption
news is usually broadcast through venues such as Twitter and Youtube which have millions of
users  and  operate  under  the  spotlight  of  the  international  community.  For  this  reason,
occasional blockings of global platforms in Turkey result in increasingly strong backlashes from
all over the world.
As a result of the government's fervent efforts in internet blocking and censorship, the Removal
Request Report by Twitter, covering the period July-December 2014, shows that requests from
Turkey are higher than from all  other countries combined (Twitter,  n.d.).  This measurable
attribute gives an idea about the level of censorship in the country. However, this seemingly
does not make sense, because technical bypass measures such as changing DNS settings and
using VPN are widely used in the country. As a result, sometimes Twitter usage increases in
Turkey after Twitter bans take effect (BBC, 2014a). So why does the government, which must be
well  aware  of  the  “Streisand  effect”,  take  such  measures  that  harm  its  reputation?  One
explanation is  an attempt to criminalise  social  media usage (Tufekci,  2014).  Although this
interpretation may have some merit, a more plausible explanation is related with the profile of
the internet users in the country. The users who have the proficiency to bypass the ban are, by
definition,  comparatively  more  educated.  The  AKP government,  however,  mainly  relies  on
comparatively less educated and conservative masses from rural and urban areas (Tillman,
2014) who turn to TV channels - most of which are government-controlled - when internet
Internet censorship in Turkey
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 13 June 2015 | Volume 4 | Issue 2
sources are blocked. 
IRAN
Iran is another country where the internet is heavily censored. PLatforms like Twitter and
Facebook are banned and there are attempts to block VPN software as well as Tor, which is
widely used to circumvent the censorship (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2015). Attempts like these
have been made in the past, most pf which were then successfully circumvented later (Arma,
2011; O'Neill, 2014). Due to the strictly religious nature of the regime, Iran has introduced a
filtering system called “Halal  Internet”  (O'Neill,  2014).  Aryan and Halderman (2013)  have
technically analysed the Iranian censorship mechanism under various lights: http host-based
blocking, keyword filtering, DNS hijacking, and protocol-based throttling. The authors argue
that the mechanism possibly relies on centralised equipment which they believe is easier to
circumvent in the future. This seems to contrast with the Turkish experience which relies on
ISPs as intermediaries to perform the blocking. As stated above, the amendments in Law No.
5651  led  to  the  establishment  of  an  ISP  union  with  compulsory  membership.  The  most
important function of this union is to execute blocking orders by the TIB within four hours. It is
not clear why the blocking orders are not simply fulfilled by TTNET, which runs the backbone.
CHINA
China also blocks the internet widely through the Great Firewall of China (Feng and Guo, 2013).
Contrary to Turkey, where access to the banned sites through VPN or Tor cannot be technically
prevented, the Chinese government can block Tor8 - a sophisticated privacy tool commonly
used for  circumventing  internet  blockings  (MIT Technology  Review,  2012).  It  is  not  clear
whether the technology used by China is commercially available. King, Pan and Roberts (2013)
analysed  the  internet  censorship  practices  in  China  and  found  that,  against  general
understanding, criticism of the Chinese government, its policies and leaders are not likely to be
censored. The authors argue that the posts which contain calls for collective action and social
mobilisation against the government and its policies are the ones that are blocked. This is more
or less the same in Turkey where, except for sporadic cases that seem to stem from some
overzealous officers like in the Zaytung case, individual criticism of the government is not
likely to be censored. Like in China, calls for social mobilisation appear likely to attract much
harsher  responses  from  the  Turkish  government.  However,  unlike  China,  technical  and
institutional weaknesses prevent most of such calls to be censored, let alone punished. This
results in arbitrariness of the “law enforcement” where some of such calls are harshly punished
and some go unnoticed.
As an element of context here, institutional and technical weaknesses of the government cannot
be understood without analysing the bitter  fight  of  now President Erdoğan with Fethullah
Gülen, a religious leader who lives in exile.9
The power struggle led to important consequences: firstly, Turkey has become the first and only
country where computer fraud was effectively used to topple a ruling class and its ideology (in
power since 80 years). Secondly, purges of “old guards” and Gülen followers from bureaucracy
resulted in the loss of well-trained staff and led to increasingly severe technical and institutional
weaknesses which have had implications for censorship. And thirdly, beyond specific issues such
as internet censorship, the fierce fight for power adversely affected almost all public institutions,
many  of  which  became much less  effective  compared  to  ten  years  ago.  For  example,  the
Scientific  and Technological  Research Council  of  Turkey  (TÜBİTAK),  which has  become a
boxing ring between Gülenists and AKP followers (Anadolu Ajansi, 2015; Todayszaman, 2015),
had to decline requests for expertise in specific issues like digital forensics, mainly because
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of the loss of qualified personnel (Saymaz and Çelikkan, 2015).
Getting back to the comparison of Turkish and Chinese internet censorship practices, there is an
important difference between the two countries: King, Pan and Roberts (2013) argue that posts
about corruption are usually not censored in China. However, this does not mean that all of such
posts are tolerated. On the contrary, some of them are subject to censorship as Richet (2013)
reports. While China demonstrates some level of tolerance to corruption news, posts about
corruption of high-ranking government officials are fervently blocked in Turkey. For example,
the  government  went  to  great  lengths  to  block  Twitter  accounts  @Haramzadeler333  and
@Bascalan,  which  were  instrumental  in  disseminating  the  corruption  recordings  of  17-25
December 2013.
CONCLUSION
Internet has become a very important medium of communication, entertainment and business
in today’s  society.  This  is  true for not only the so-called developed countries,  but also for
developing countries. The “Arab Spring” has demonstrated that the internet can play a role in
mobilising people, eventually even leading to the toppling of authoritarian governments (note:
what comes after, is another story). Unlike mass media - which is easier to control due to its
centralised nature,  internet  is  a  truly decentralised and chaotic  environment which is  very
difficult to control. Additionally, there is no technical tool that guarantees hundred percent
control over the internet. As the examples in this article show, attempts to control the internet
may result in little success, while harming the reputation of rulers all over the world.
Turkey's recent history is marked by severe turbulences that came one after the other. After
AKP's ascend to power in 2002, the anxiety and suspicion of the military and civil bureaucracy
did not result in a coup, due to the lack of support from the Western world. After the AKP and
its  allied  Gülen  movement  (which  have  exactly  the  same  ideological-religious
background) managed to eliminate the possible threat of  the bureaucracy,  they started the
infighting. All these events were associated with redesigning the society according to religious
rules, resulting in an increasingly divided population. This in turn paved the way to increasingly
high tensions in the society. Turkey's internet censorship practices followed this course, albeit
with little success in preventing free speech for all. It is, however, open to discussion whether
the internet censorship has been successful to prevent the conveying of free speech to those
parts of Turkish society which have lower levels of education.
Internet censorship is usually practiced to protect the social order. Social order, however, is a
complicated term which has different meanings in different contexts. In the case of Turkey, to
complicate the matter even further, a new “source” for internet censorship has been added to
the list since December 2013: protecting individuals at the highest echelons of politics from
“defamation”  resulting  from  the  use  of  the  internet  for  broadcasting  explicit  corruption
recordings. This again demonstrates the power of the internet vis-à-vis  mass media that is
controlled directly or indirectly by the government.
FOOTNOTES
1. The role of Turkish Telecom is important in this context, because it runs the internet
backbone in Turkey via its subsidiary TTNET.
2. As a counterpoint meant to put these numbers in perspective, a unit within the State Planning
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Organisation – responsible for coordinating efforts for transforming Turkey into an
“Information Society” – was established in 2003 with only five members of staff. Four years
later, in 2007, it grew to a mere 15 staff. The unit acted as the secretariat of the “E-
transformation Executive Committee,” which consisted of cabinet ministers, high-level
bureaucrats and representatives of NGOs with observer status. The unit is currently responsible
for preparing the “Information Society Strategy 2014-2018” which was published in March 2015
(Bilgi Toplumu Stratejisi, 2015).
3. Imprisonment was removed in 2014.
4. Items 7 and 9 were added later.
5. Turkey is very sensitive with regard to Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. Law No.
5816, which penalises insults to Atatürk, was passed in 1951 and it has not changed since then.
“Defamatory material against Atatürk” was included as a catalogue crime to Law No. 5651 on
April 12, 2007 during the deliberations of the Justice Commission in the Parliament.
6. The material contained links to Youtube videos.
7. Due to this blatant violation of personal privacy (Cellan-Jones, 2008; Fuchs, 2012), Phorm
has been ousted from almost all countries it had previously operated in. The list includes the
United States, some European Union member states, and South Korea. The European
Commission went to court in 2009 against the UK government for allowing Phorm to operate in
the UK (EC, 2009). It is not known how these profiles are used along with advertisement.
8. Tor can be found under http://www.torproject.org
9. Gülen has established a semi-clandestine organisation in the last forty years and used to have
an increasingly stronger power base in Turkey. His followers have established schools and
universities in more than one hundred countries. AKP and Gülen had been close allies since
2002 and their cooperation resulted in the elimination of the traditional power of Western-
oriented, secular and authoritarian military and civil bureaucracy which ruled the country since
the foundation of the republic. AKP provided votes of the masses and Gülen provided well-
trained cadres in the police force and judiciary in this cooperation. A series of trials against the
“old guard” started in 2010 and resulted in hundreds of military officers, including top generals,
to be sent to prison with the accusation of planning a coup against the government (Arsu, 2012).
As a result, about twenty percent of the generals who were in active duty were put into prison
along with hundreds of lower ranking officers (Butler, 2012). The most important evidence in
these trials were computer hard disks and DVDs that contained some files hinting towards
preparations for a coup. Some convincing arguments by the defendants who claimed that
electronic evidence was fabricated (Rodrik, 2012; Doğan and Rodrik, 2011) were disregarded in
the trials. After the power of the military was broken in 2013 the former allies started a bitter
fight for acquiring the sole power in the country. During this fight, Erdoğan suddenly “recalled”
that it was Gülen followers who hatched a plot by fabricating the false electronic evidence
against the accused officers. He blamed Gülen and his followers of establishing a “parallel state”
within the bureaucracy. This resulted in a hunt against the Gülenists within the bureaucratic
apparatus. At the same time, the cases against the military were reopened and almost all of the
accused military were acquitted in 2015 due to the fraudulent electronic evidence (BBC, 2015;
The New York Times, 2015). It was now Gülen followers' turn to be put in prison. An arrest
warrant had been issued for Gülen himself on 19 December 2014 (BBC, 2014b) and many of his
followers in the bureaucracy including some of the judges and prosecutors who had sent the
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generals to prison were either fired from their duties or arrested in the first half of 2015
(Diclehaber, 2015; Dailysabah, 2015).
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